Abstract-
consists o f a number of plain end hosts, called peers. connected via either TCP or UDP. Existing protocols construct overlays by finding the right set of connections, which we call virtual links, among peers to form a connected graph. There is a rich literature on the design, implementation, and evaluation of various protocols for constructing goad overlaysl mostly in the context of end-host multicast, e.g., HMTP [SI, Narada [3] , NICE 171, TMesh [41, Yoid [SI, and Zigzag [91. These protocols all assume that end hosts are identical in processing power, bandwidth, and reachability. The Internet, however, is far more heterogeneous. This paper studies one aspect of this heterogeneity-the existence. of guarded hosts. A host is guarded if it is unable to accept incoming connections from those outside its local area network. This may happen if it is behind a NAT. [lo] gateway or a firewall. or that it is too under-provisioned to act as a server of any kind.' Similarly, a host that permits incomins connections as well as outgoing connections is open.
With the presence of guarded hosts, network reachability is no longer symmetric for every pair of overlay hosts. Given any group of hosts, an unknown number of them cannot accept incoming connections, and consequently are unable to relay messages. This complicates overlay constructions ' It is also possible that a host is only addressable to pari of the Internet due to policy settings or access controls {see Seclion IV.) in two ways. First. not all uni-directional virtual links are valid. This additional constraint requires many existing overlay protocols to re-design their algorithms and implementations. Second, simple modifications of existing protocols may not make effective use of open hosts, likely producing suboptimal overlays with either bad overlay latencies-latencies of paths computed on the overlay network-r some highly loaded hosts. Our measurements from eDonkey and Gnutella filesharing services indicate that as many as 36% of the hosts may be guarded [ll] . Chu et al. reported even higher percentages in their Internet overiay multicast experiments [12] . In such an environment. existing protocols, modified to work with guarded hosts, suffer up to 37% degradation in the average latency on an overlay.
We propose an overlay optimization technique named e*, which achieves good performance with a relatively low overhead. e* uses locality-aware clustering to organize guarded hosts and shortcuts to reduce overlay latencies. The key to e*'s Performance is its cluster-center election protocol and shortcut-selection heuristic. The election protocol selects well provisioned hosts as centers, based on a rank function that takes into account not only addressability, but also network capacity and latency. The shortcut-selection heuristic improves performance by intelligently adding virtuaI links to eliminate poorly connected overlay nodes. Our studies on both generaled network topologies and B snapshot of an ISP topology show that compared with current overlay protocols, e* achieves lower average overlay latency even in the presence of a large number of guarded hosts. For example, when 40% of the nodes are guarded, the average overlay latency with e* is 42% lower than that of Narada. In addition, e* has low overhead and utilizes very few network resources. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first discuss related work. The effect of guarded hosts on existing overlay protocols is presented in Section 111. Our e* protocol is outlined in Section IV, with performance evaluation in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.
RELATED WORK
Existing p2P file-sharing applications address the guardsdhost problem using an ad hoc "push" mechanism. A guarded host A joins a file-sharing network by connecting to a proxyserver, Search or download requests from other peers must be routed through the proxy-server. Host A then returns the search results or requested files directly to the intended recipients. This "push" mechanism may cause long access latency if a poorly connected proxy-server is chosen. Currently. we are aware of only one study on handling guarded hosts in overlay construction [13] CAN [191, and Tapestry [20] . Accommodating guarded hosts in structured overlays is a major challenge because they generally require the presence of certain links to complete the regular structure. Not having symmetric connection capability wil1 preclude some of these required links. Ensuring that structured overlays work in the presence of guarded hosts is our future work. Besides DHTs, several generic overlay protocols also include locality-aware clustering, e.g., NICE and Zigzag. NICE and Zigzag organize members of a multicast group into a hierarchy of clusters so that the constructed overlay has nice properties in terms of the maximum node degree and control overhead.
Similar to DKT overlays, Zigzag and NICE currently do not consider the presence of guarded hosts in their overlay coosmc lions.
The authors in 141 examine a scheme where random links are added among overlay nodes with the hope that such "shortcuts" may improve end-to-end latencies on the overlay. The intuition is that random rewiring or adding links in a regular graph resuirs in small-world network 1211, which have both a regular-graph like structure and a small average path length. It is shown that this scheme does improve overlay latencies for a tree topology, although less effective than adding carefully selected links.
The guarded-host problem persists even in new architectures that can accommodate NAT. Francis and Gummadi propose an extension to the current Internet architecture by adding an IP Next Layer (IPNL) above IPv4 [22] to identify and address hosts behind NAT gateways. However, IPNL does not eliminate the presence of guarded hosts since networks are likely to deploy firewalls for security reasons. I D 6 may also reduce the use of NAT due to the much larger address space. However, even with IPv6, firewalls are again likely to be present, and NAT may continue to exist because it provides the benefit of address isolation for network providers and subscribers. With the increasing population of mobile IP and handheld devices that are limited in both CPU power and battery life, more and more hosts may lose the capability to serve content directly. We believe our work will be applicable in such environments as well as under NewArch [23] or Plutarch [241.
m. EFFECT OF GUARDED HOSTS ON CURRENT

CONSTRUCTIONS
We have studied the prevalence of guarded hosts on the Tnternel by conducting measurements on existing P2P networks. Our experiments on two P2P file-sharing network discovered over 180.000 hosts. Among the various probes in eDonkey and Gnutella, as many as 36% of the clients were guarded [l I] . Clearlyi the lack of two-way communication capability is prevalent in the current Internet.
In this section, we study how guarded hosts affect overlay protocols on generated network topologies. We first give a brief overview of the existing overlay protocols and the evaluation meuic. The simulation setup is described next. Finally, we present the performance of these proiocols, slightly modified to accommodate guarded hosts.
A. Exisrinp Protocols and the Performance Metric
We study four overlay protocols: HMTP, Narada, TMesh, and Yoid. HMTP and Yoid build wee overlays where there is a single path between arzy node pair, while Narada and TMesh build mesh overlays where multiple paths may exist between any node pair. Studying both tree based and mesh based overlays provides a more comprehensive picture of the effect of guarded hosts.
Most of the existing protocols rely on overlay optimization algorithms to gradually improve the quality of the constructed overlays in terms of latency. Here, we make a distinction between the latencies on an overlay, which we call overlay latencies, from unicast latencies, which are the latencies in the underlying physical topology. Therefore, the main performance metric we adopt in this paper is the Average Relutii?e Reluv Penalty (ARDPJ as defined in [41. Relative Delay Penalty (RDP) is the ratio of the overlay latency between nodes i and j to their unicast latency Di,j [3] . ARDP is then the average RDP among all node pairs:
where AT is the number of nodes in the overlay. Smaller ARDP is an indication that most overlay latencies are close to the respective unicast latencies. If h e overlay were a full mesh, in which all members are directly connected, the ARDP would be 1 .
Generally, an overlay with a larger number of links would produce lower ARDP but consumes more network resources. Therefore, tree based overlays usually have higher ARDP than mesh based overlays. On the other hand, as shown Later, with the same number of links, the ARDP of an overlay may vary considerably dcpending on its path optimization algorithm.
Chu er al. discovered that, in the real Internet. the RDP between nodes z and j may be less than 1, that is, the latency between 1 and j i n the overlay may be less than their latency in the network [23]. This may happen if the data path between two nodes is not the shorlest path due to various routing policies enforced by ISPs [26] . In our study, we assume that all traffics are routed through the shortest paths so the RDP between any two nodes is never less than 1. The result of ignoring such effect is that our experiments likely overestimate the RDPs of various overlay protocols. On the Internet, these protocols including e* could perform better and achieve lower RDP than reported here.
In addition to A W P , we also use 90%-tile RDP and Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of RDP to give a more complete picture of the quality of overlay latency under different overlay protocols.
B. Simulation Setup
We conduct our simulations on topologies with and without power-law node degree distribution to ensure ow qualitative conclusions are robust against network topology. For powerlaw based topology, we use a topology of 4,000 nodes generated by the Inet-3.0 topology generator [27] ; for nonpowerlaw topology, we use a transit-stub topoIogy of 4.400 nodes generated by the GT-ITM topology generator [2S].' We further evaluate our protocol on a snapshot of the Internet topology in Section V-G. All experiments show results similar to the ones presented.
Each of our experiments is conducted on a particular topology (GT-ITM or Inet), using one of the overlay protocols (Yoid, HMTP. Narada, TMesh, or later a*), with a particular overlay size (from 50 to 1000), and a particular percentage of guarded hosts (from 20% to 50%). Given an overlay size, we randomly select members from the network topology. Different percentages of guarded hosts are then evenly distributed among the overlay nodes, for example, 30% and 40% as indicated in our empirical study [l In our experiments, we assume a similar bandwidth distribution among hosts in our overlays. We simulate the network capacity of a host by appropriately limiting its maximum node degree (see Table  I ). For instance, a host with connection speed less than 100 Kbps would have a maximum node degree of two. Note that the maximum degree is not set proportional to its connection speed because having higher node degree or serving more clients will consume increasingly more CPU cycles, which are important for applications with high data rate. We limit the maximum node degree to ten. Narada is on average 16% lower than that of the onginal HMTP. However, this ARDP improvement comes at a cost. We use the number of links in an overlay to measure protocol overhead and network resource usage. Comparing Narada with HMTF' , Narada uses about twice as many links to achieve the 16% latency improvement (see Fig. 3 ). In practice, we should select the protocol with the right trade-off between performance and overhead. Both Narada and TMesh show very little fluctuation with respect to the overlay size or guarded hosts. When the perof guarded hosts. Even with m e s h . however, when 40% of nodes are guarded hosts, the ARDP is a factor of three for groups with 200 or more nodes. This means that for a nodepair with 80-100ms round-trip time (RTT), the latency between them in TMesh could be over 300ms. Studies have indicated that some Internet applications such as Voice-over-IP [30] and multi-player games [31] require RTT of less than 300ms to be usable. In the next section, we introduce and evaluate e*. an algorithm that can help existing protocols achieve much Iower
C. Effect of Guorded
ARDP.
centage of guarded hosts increases from 30% to 50%, Narada experiences 22% to 31% increase in ARDP compared with the original Narada (Fig. IC) . Although these percentages are comparable to that of HMTP (Fig. lb) . the nominal ARDP values are better in Narada because Narada builds a more connected overlay, as shown in Fig. 3 , rather than a tree.in HMTP. By constructing a better connected overlay, Narada increases the chance of finding a shorter path between two nodes. A more connected overlay is also less sensitive to the placement of guarded hosts. Hence, we see that the ARDPs of Narada and TMesh don't fluctuate as much as that of I-IMTP.
IV. GUARDED-AWARE OVERLAY CONSTRUCTION
A natural approach in integrating guarded hosts into an overlay is to.group them into clusters based on locality, and assign: an, open host as the center of each cluster. To achieve ireasonable. performance, cluster centers must be carefully .selected to meet several criteria, such as the speed of network connection and unicast latencies to other nodes in the cluster.
Furthermore, each guarded host may need to establish virtual links (shortcuts) to additional open hosts to improve overlay latencies. In this section, we address the two key questions of ciuster-center election and shortcut selection. Similarly, an increase in the percentage of guarded hosts adversely affects mesh (Fig. Id) . However, TMesh clearly delivers the Iowest absolute ARDP values among all the protocols studied. Even with 40% guarded hosts, TMesh still out-performs the original Narada, especially for large overlays. Furthermore, TMesh achieves better performance using a smaller number of links than Narada, as shown in Fig. 4 . Compared with the original TMesh. the 33% increase in A D P when 50% of the hosts are guarded results fiom TMesh wing 17% fewer links than the original TMesh. Even so, these numbers compare favorably against those from the other protocols.
In Fig. 1 , TMesh provides the lowest ARDP in the presence Several graph-theoretic algorithms, such as I;-HST [32], min K-center 1331, and 1-greedy 1343, may be used to perform center placement. While these algorithms offer either absolute or probabilistic bounds on the latencies between nodes in a cluster and its center, such bounds don't directly translate into improved end-to-end latencies, which is more important for overlay communication. Instead of center placement, a class of related algorithms generate spanner subgraphs, such as t-spanner 1351, which offers a geometric bound on endto-end latency distortion, or &-swetcher [361, which offers an arithmetic bound.
In t-spanner, guaranteeing a geometric bound t for each real edge in the physical topology suffices to guarantee the same Algorithm 1 (e*)
1. Let G* = ( V * = 0. E* = 0). U = 0 3.
4,
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6. bound on end-to-end latencies. This is generally less computation intensive compared with guaranteeing an arithmetic bound on all pair-wise latencies. A geometric bound in general also yields more sparse spanners compared with chose with appropriately tight arithmetic bounds. However, a geometric bound is unnecessarily restrictive for paths with very small latencies, and excessively lax for paths with long latencies. For example. in a 2-spanner, a path with unicast latency of 2 ms must have an overlay latency no worse than 4 ms, while a palh with latency of 100 ms may have an overlay latency as poor as 200 ms. With an additive constant of 10 ms, the same paths would be no worse than 12 and 110 ms, respectively. An additive bound is thus a more meaningful criterion. Our experiments on f-spanner confirm that it doesn't perform as well as €-stretcher (see Fig. 18 ). We thus adopt the €-stretcher algorithm in our design of e*. We first present a centralized e* algorithm and show that it indeed consmcts overlays with much lower ARDP compared with existing algorithms. This centralized algorithm can then be transformed into a more practical distributed e* of a similar structure.
A. Centralized e*
In the following discussion. G : (V,E) refers to the original graph, with V being the set of vertices, and E the set of edges. U , U , and 'U' are generic members of the set V , and ( U , w ) and (zL,'~') are edges in the set E . The function ~G ( u , v ' ) returns the cost of the edge ( u ,~' ) .
G' comes from locally clustering nodes in G . and G, is the t-stretcher 1361 of G*.
The e* algorithm, or simply e*, consists of three phases. In the hst phase. it partitions the set of hosts V into clusters and selects cluster cenleis U . This is shown in Fig. 5, lines 1-8 . A node U is randomly selected, and all other nodes within & / 2 form a star topology around U (Fig. 6a) , If a more qualified center exists in the cluster, it may replace U to become the cluster center. Phase two, on line 9. interconnects cluster centers among themselves to form a connected backbone (Fig. 6b) . In the final phase on line 10, the &-stretcher algorithm is applied to add extra links or shortcuts to improve overlay latencies. We note that the final phase of e* is independent of the first two phases, such that it can be applied to other overlay protocols like Narada and HMTP (Figs.11-13 ). For all node pairs that are directly connecled, d is zero. A virtual link between two nodes not directly connected on the overlay may serve as a shortcut for themselves as well as other node pairs. For example, the virtual link AB in Fig. 6b is a potential shortcut. If the latency bias Sa4, is above a pre-defined threshold value -cl the shortcut A B may be added, and r 5~~ becomes zero. as shown in Fig. 6c . All potential shortcuts are evaluated in the non-decreasing order of link latency.
There are three settings in the e* algorithm that affect the overlay performance:
Accuracy parameter E: E determines the trade-off between the quality of overlay latencies and the number of virtual links used. With highly dynamic membership in an overlay, it may be difficult to use a static E value. A small E on a sparsely connected overlay may yield a l&ge number of virtual links. On the other hand, a large E could result in a poorly connected overlay. One solution is to dynamically adjust E based on the latency information of overlay participants. In practice, it is difficult to achieve the given bound E on overlay latencies. However, e* would be exrremely useful in avoiding a poorly constructed overlay with very large overlay latencies. Cluster Center interconnection: Since guarded hosts are connected to an overlay primarily through their cluster centers, we need to construct a connected and eflcient overlay among cluster centers. An efficient initial overlay is important to achieving good performance [4] .
Node degree allocation: In e*, a cluster center C has two types of neighbors: nodes in its own cluster and other cluster centers. Since C has limited bandwidth and processing power in practice, it should carefully allocate its node degree to maintain a balance between connecting to other cluster centers for better performance and serving as many clients as possible in its own cluster. Next, we show that the the centralized e* can build lowlatency overlays even when a large percentage of hosts are guarded, under the assumption of global knowledge and coordination.
1 ) Performance of Centralized e*: To compare our results on e* with the results we have on existing overlay protocols, we use the same experiment setup described in Section III-B.
The implementation of e* requires global latency information in that the E value is set to 30%-tile of the unicast latency distribution of overlay nodes. The implementation follows the procedure outlined in Fig. 5 except during clustering, each cluster center reserves at leas1 two of its node degree for interconnections to other cluster centers. For shortcut selection. a virtual link is added whenever a path on the overlay has a latency bias greater than E. Fig. 7 shows the ARDP results of e* applied to test scenarios presented in Section 111-C. The results of Narada and TMesh with 407~ guarded host are included for comparison. In Fig. 7 , we see very small degradation in ARDP with 20% and 40% of the hosts being guarded. Even with 50% guarded hosts, e* only experiences about 7% ARDP degradation in the worst case compared to the case with no guarded hosts. In terms of absolute ARDP, e* achieves significantly lower ARDP than existing protocols that we have studied, While TMesh achieves an ARDP of 3. e* is able to deliver an ARDP of 2.
As one may expect, there is a trade-off between performance (improved overlay latencies) and overhead (the number of virtual links used). e* uses nearly 50% more links compared with Narada, nearly twice as many as TMesh. A detluled study of our simulation results shows that the final one-third of the virtual links added by e* contribute only 7% improvement to ARDP. Adding more shortcuts to an e* overlay clearly has a diminishing return. To reduce the number of links with relative minor contributlnns, we modify e* to stop adding links when e* uses the same number of links as Narada.
The resulting algorithm achieves practically identical results as the unmodified e*. The observauon that shortcuts improve the ARDP of an e* overlay with diminishing return leads us to the shortcut selection heuristic used in the distributed version of the e* algorithm, as described next.
B. Distributed e* Protocol
In this section, we present a three-phase distributed e* protocol with each phase corresponding to one in the centralized e* algorithm. First, a center-election protocol is applied based on a cenler rank vector. After centers are elected. they may be interconnected by an overlay protocol such as HMTP, Narada, or TMesh. The virtual links that interconnect cluster centers form an overlay called cenrer ovuluy. In the third and final phase, shortcuts are evaluated and added to the overlay by individuaI nodes, based on a selection heuristic, to improve the quality of the final overlay.
The e* protocol requires only limited local coordination and no global knowledge. "'be center-election protocol involves coordination only among those members in the same cluster. For shortcut selection. each node independently measures its potential shortcuts and calculates the latency biases.
Rendezvous Service
Contact The e* protocol consists of the following components: rendezvous service, the procedure to join an overlay, distributed center-election protocol. cluster improvement, and shortcut selection. Fig. S shows a flowchart of the e* protocol by illustrating the steps that a new member A goes through in joining an e* overlay. Host A first contacts the rendezvous service provided by a well known rmdezvous bosf (Rhost) [8], whose main purpose is to bootstrap new members into the overlay. A obtains a list of cluster centers from Rhost and then joins a nearby cluster. After A joins the overlay, it participates i n the center election of its cluster. A may also add several shortcuts to other open hosts on the overlay. Since overlay nodes come and go, clusters may be split to accommodate more members or merged to reduce the number of clusters. The center election, shortcut selection, and cluster improvement tasks may be done in parallel. To detect node failure, centers exchange "heartbeat" messages, so do members in each cluster.
Next, we discuss setting the E value and detecting whether a host is guarded. We then present details for center election and shortcut selection. The details on the remaining components of e* protocol, including rendezvous service, joining procedure, and cluster improvement, are available in t371.
E Value and Guarded Host Detection
The E vatue plays an important role in e*. As we will show in Section V-A, the performance of e* is robust to a range of E values, so the E value can be set either by the Rhost, or by a nominated cluster center based on measurements from previous runs of the algorithm or measurements from current cluster members.
After 
Center Election Protocol
Center election in a cluster is based on a center rank vector (CRV). Each overlay node has its own CRV. Each element in the CRV is a test condition for center election. A typical CRV looks like this: CRV =< open. c q a c i y , lyerime, clusterdisr >. with its schema explained in Table II .
Each overlay node is responsible for maintaining the correctness of its CRV. A node periodically updates its CRV by active and passive probing. The computation of clusterdist requires latencies to other cluster members, which can be measured using the periodically exchanged "heartbeat" messages without extra overhead. capacily depends on the available bandwidth to a node, which can be measured or estimated with some light-weight measurement tools, such as IGI [38] or Spruce [391. Additionally. a node could maintain a history of the maximum throughput of the most recent downloads and use these effective bandwidths to compute capacic.
Each cluster member includes CRVs as part of its "heartbeat" messages to others in the same cluster. The received CRVs are then sorted in the order of the four elements with open having the highest priority and clusterdist the lowest. The node with the top ranked CRV is elected as the center with IP address used as the tie-breaker.
In a dynamic network environment, a cluster center may depart unexpectedly at any time. Thus, there should be a pool of backup cenlers that can replace departed cluster centers.
To qudify as a backup, a node must meet some minimal requirements. Clearly, only open hosts can be centers. A node must also have capacity above a given threshold value. For robustness, A cluster may reject all join or split messages if it does not have a sufficient number of backup centers. The details are available in [37] .
Shortcut Selection Heuristic
The final phase in the e* protocol adds shortcuts to reduce overlay latencies. The shortcut selection in the centralized e* The shortcut selection heuristic permits a node with low degree to increase the A value if it has excess capacity. If a node cannot find any qualified virtual link after a predefined amount of time. it doubles the A value to increase the probability of finding shortcuts. E/?.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Previously, we have examined the performance of existing overlay protocols in the presence of guarded hosts. as well as the centralized e* algorithm. In this section. we conduct a detailed evaluation of the dislributed e* protocol on overlay latency as well as the overhead.
Since the accuracy parameter E affects both the cluster radius and the shortcut selection heuristic, it is very important for the e* algorithm to be robust against a range of E values. We first study the sensitivity of e* to the choice of E . While e* may use its own method of interconnecting cluster centers and between cluster centers and cluster nodes. authors in [41 have shown that existing protocols have very efficient mechanisms building overlays once cluster centers are eIected. Thus, we investigate the performance of combining e* for shortcut selection and KMTP, Narada, and m e s h prolocols for connecting center overlays. In addition to ARDF! we also examine the following metria: 90%-tile RDP, node degree distribution, protocol overhead, and network resource usage.
We use the same simulation scenarios used throughout this paper, including maximum degree setting as described in Section 111-B. Due to space limit, we only present here the results from network topologies generated by GT-ITM and from a snapshot of the Internet topology. 
A. Effect of E Value
The accuracy parameter E serves two purposes in e*: to determine the cluster radius and the upper bound for latency bias during link selection. In the centralized e* algorithm, E is set to the 30%-tile of the unicast latency distribution. It is desirable to set the E value as a percentage of the largest unicasi latency in our distributed protocol because intuitively, it could adapt to the group dynamics. However, as the disvibution of unicast latency changes with dynamic overlay membership, it is infeasible to obtain this information on the Internet in real time. An alternative is to estimate E based on partial or historic knowledge of unicast latencies. Since we are likely to use a range of E values, we need to evaluate how robust e* is to variations in E. For this purpose, we define three types of E values: accurate-E, partial-E, and historical-&. Accurate-€ is calculated assuming complete knowledge of unicast latencies, partial-. is based od the latency information collected from a subset of cument overlay members. and historical-,c is an E value measured in previous runs of the e* algorithm.
To evaluate the use of partial-[ and historical-€ in e*. we conduct the following experiments. We compute accurate-& from an overlay of 50 randomly chosen nodes. Let us call this overlay GI and the computed E value i. To evaluate the feasibility of using partial-&, we grow the overlay from 50 to 1,000 members, and measure the performance of e* for various overlay sizes, as reported in Fig. 9 , using the same E^ as the E value in all cases. To evaluate the feasibility of using historical-E , we randomly choose a new overlay G2 of 50 nodes distinct from those in GI. We then measure the performance of e* on this overlay, as the overIay grows from 50 to 1,000 members, again using the same E as the E value in all cases. Fig. 9 shows the results. For comparison purpose, we also show the ARDP of e* when accurate-& values are used. The use of partial-E and historical-e do not give rise to a significant variation in
ARDP.
We next study the robustness of e* with a range of . E values by specifying that each member determines its awn E value as a fixed percentile of the distribution of measured unicast latency to all other members. Fig, 10 shows the performance of e* €or E determined based on various percentiles of the measured unicast latency distribution.
While changes in E can result in changes in cluster radius and the number of clusters, most if not all of the overlay latencies are not allowed to become arbitrarily bad because of shortcut selection. The e* algorithm is robust against changes in E value because adding shortcuts helps avoid poorly connected overlays with grossly inflated overlay latencies, as long as the actual E value is reasonable. In other words, shortcut selection improves the robustness of network-overlay construction by eliminating those highly distorted overlay networks.
B. ARDP and 90%-tile RDP
In this section, we show h e performance of e* in terms of ARDP and RUP when center overlays are connected using HMTP. Narada, or m e s h . Our results show that e* can significantly improve the quality of existing overlay protocols.
Even with 50% of the overlay nodes as guarded, e* can help TMesh achieve lower ARDP than m e s h without any guarded hosts.
Figs. 1 1 to 13 show the ARDP of using the shortcut selection in e* with center overlay constructed using HMTP, Narada, and TMesh, respectively. We name the e* shortcut selection wjth centers connected by HMTP, e*-HMTP, and similarly, e*-Nxada and e*-TMesh for center overlays connected using Narada and m e s h . Compared with the ARDP degradation of ail the protocoIs shown in Section III-C, it is clear that the use of e* results in much lower ARDP degradation. With 20% guarded hosts, we hardly see any change in ARDP Even with 50% guarded hosts, e*-HMTP and e*-T'Mesh experience around only 12% and 6% degradation in ARDP, respectively.
The use of e* also improves ARDP in absolute terms. For overlays with 40% guarded hosts, the ARDP of e*-HMTP i s 42% and 25% lower than those of the original Narada and M e s h . respectively. The advantage of the e* can also be observed from the 90%-tile RDP (Fig. 14) . For example, with 40% of members being guarded hosts, the 90%-tile RDP of e*-HMTP is 46.6% lower than that of Narada, and 33.2% lower than that of TMesh.
We notice that e* based protocols in general use slightly more links than the originals. Far example, e*-HMTp with 40% guarded host uses about 6.3% more links than Narada.
However, considering that it achieves 41.6% lower ARDP, the use of extra links is quite reasonable. Another observation is that despite the performance difference between original HMTP and m e s h , they perform equally well in conjunction with e*. The selected shortcuts equalize the difference between e*-HMTP and e*-TMesh since both TMesh and e* use similar heuristics to add shortcuts.
To provide a more complete picture of the performance advantages afforded by e*, we also study the CDF of RDP on various overlays. In Fig. 15 , we show the result on a 600-node overlay with 40% of the nodes being guarded. As expected, we see that e* based protocols produce latency distributions with very thin tails as well as good mean values, compared with the existing overlay protocols.
In this set of experiments, the E value is set to the 30%-tile unicast latency by Rkost, and OUT CRV consists of <open, cqucily, clusterdist> only. A maximum degree greater or equal to four is required for a node to become a cluster center. 
CDF of RDP of various overlays
Given a cluster center, half of its node degree is allocated for cluster clients, and the other half is reserved for inter-cluster connections and shortcuts.
C. Node Degree and Center Dislribiition
Node degree distribution indicates the workload distribution of an overlay. Nodes with higher degrees contribute more resources. Fig. 16 shows the node degree distribution under different protocols on the 600-node overlay when 40% of members are guarded hosts. Clearly, e* based protocols produce more nodes with high degrees. Our investigation shows that most of the high degree nodes are centers in the e* overlay. This is because shortcut selection in e* deliberately increases the connectivity of cluster centers. This property can be beneficial to content providers, who can place wellprovisioned, high-capacity nodes on the network to support overlay service. These nodes can serve as cluster centers and facilitate a more efficient overlay.
There are several plateaus in the CDF that only happen in e* overlays, such as the one from degree seven to degree nine. The plateau between degree seven and nine indicates that there are very few nodes with these degrees. The endpoints of the plateaus match the maximum node degrees in our experimental setup. For example, as shown in Table I , we have maximum node degrees of SIX and ten, which happen to be the end-points of the plateau between seven and nine. Since e* prefers to place centers on high-capacity nodes, most nodes with the maximum node degree (ten] are elected as centers and operating at their maximum capacities, which explains why we hardly see nodes with degrees from seven to nine.
The plateaus in node degree distribution can also be explained by studying the cluster size. In Table 111 , we show 
D. Link Stress
In overlay networks, a physical link may have to carry multiple streams of ihe same data from a single sender. This normally happens if a node has a higher overlay degree than the number of its physical connections to the Intemet. The number of duplicate packets carried by a link L is usually called the link stress, Fig. 17 shows the distribution of link stress of various overlays from the same 600-node overlay with 40% of the nodes guarded hosts. A routing protocol is implemented so that data is forwarded through source-rooted shortest paths on the overlay. In each simulation. we randomly pick one node to serve as the data source and count the copies of data carried by each physical link used in the overlay. Fig. 17 shows that e* based overlays have similar link stress distribution to that of TMesh, except at the tail end where link stress is above ten. Narada has many more physical links of high link stress than the rest of the protocols.
E. Protocol Overhead
In this section, we compare the protocol overhead of e* with existing cluster-aware protocols. We consider two types of protocol overhead. a dynamic overhead in nodes joining an overlay, and a static overhead of maintaining an overlay when it stabilizes. We examine two of the best performing e* based protocols, e*-HMTP and e*-mesh with NICE, Zigzag, Narada, and m e s h .
The join overhead of e* is the join overhead of the center overlay protocol used, Since in both e*-HTMP and e*-TMesh, a new node first joins a spanning tree, the average join overhead is O(logN), with the worst-case overhead of O(Nf if the tree is unbalanced. The analysis in [91 [7] shows that both the average and the worst case join overheads are O(log N ) for Zigzag and NICE. Narada randomly picks a constant number of neighbor to connect to so its join overhead would be constant. TMesh is again a tree based protocol, which has the average and worst case overhead of O(log AT) and O ( N ) , respectively.
In general, e* based protocols need to exchange status infor- a path vector algorithm similar to the one used in [4] . In e* based protocoh, only cluster centers exchange routing updates among themselves. Each cluster client receives updates only from the cluster center. We assume all protocols atso adopt &he same available bandwidth measurement implementation and exclude that overhead from the results. In Table IV , we report the protocol overhead on overlays of different sizes, where 40% of the nodes are guarded. The e* protocols show lower overhead than Narada or TMesh. Even though e* incurs extra overhead in maintaining its cluster structure, this is offset by rhe reduction in routing overhead due to relegating routing responsibility to cluster centers.
E e* vs. t-spanner
We compare the performance of e* to t-spanner when combined with existing overlay protocols. Similar to e* based protocols, we use the t-spanner algorithm for shortcut selection, while Narada, HMTP, or TMesh is used for building center overlays. We build t-spanner based overlays with shortcuts selected as follows: a shortcut between host A and B is selected if its RDP is greater than t . We set t to two. Fig. 18 shows that t-spanner based overlays indeed do not perform as well as e* based overlays.
G. Experimenrs with Internet Topology
In addition to artificial topologies generated by Inet and GT-ITM generators, we also run experiments on a routerlevel topology of a large ISP constructed from traceroute data. The traceroute probes were initiated from 50 sites on the Internet to approximately 40,000 IP addresses. The resulting topology contains 1,426 nodes. We conduct ten experiments for each overlay protocol investigated, with the same settings for guardcd hosts and maximum node degree distribution as used throughout this paper. We randomly choose 200 nodes to be in our overlay.
We show the results in Tables V. The e + based protocols consistently perform well. Adopting e* can lower the 90%-tile RDP as much as 42% comparing with existing protocols. We are currently implementing a prototype of e*-HMTP to subsequently conduct real Internet experiments.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a detailed study of network overlay protocols under limited end-to-end reachability. Our study indicates that as high as 36% of the participants in P2P fibsharing applications can be guarded hosts. The large population of guarded hosts pose major challenges on the overlay protocol design. We propose a distributed overlay protocol based on e*, which performs the best in producing low-latency overlays among all protocols studied. In addition, e* has the flexibility to work with any overlay protocol, which leaves space for further performance improvement when used with more advanced protocols. We have demonsuated that e* protocol is an effective and practical solution to address problems presented by guarded hosts.
